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Much is known about development of the ability to label facial expressions of emotion
(e.g., as happy or sad), but rather less is known about the emergence of more complex
emotional face processing skills. The present study investigates one such advanced
skill: the ability to tell if someone is genuinely feeling an emotion or just pretending (i.e.,
authenticity discrimination). Previous studies have shown that children can discriminate
authenticity of happy faces, using expression intensity as an important cue, but have
not tested the negative emotions of sadness or fear. Here, children aged 8–12 years
(n = 85) and adults (n = 57) viewed pairs of faces in which one face showed a genuinely-
felt emotional expression (happy, sad, or scared) and the other face showed a pretend
version. For happy faces, children discriminated authenticity above chance, although
they performed more poorly than adults. For sad faces, for which our pretend and
genuine images were equal in intensity, adults could discriminate authenticity, but children
could not. Neither age group could discriminate authenticity of the fear faces. Results
also showed that children judged authenticity based on intensity information alone for
all three expressions tested, while adults used a combination of intensity and other
factor/s. In addition, novel results show that individual differences in empathy (both
cognitive and affective) correlated with authenticity discrimination for happy faces in
adults, but not children. Overall, our results indicate late maturity of skills needed to
accurately determine the authenticity of emotions from facial information alone, and raise
questions about how this might affect social interactions in late childhood and the teenage
years.
Keywords: facial emotion, genuine, posed, Duchenne, empathy
Introduction
Developmental studies of facial expression processing have focused almost exclusively on children’s
ability to label emotional facial expressions (i.e., as happy vs. sad etc.; for review see Widen, 2013).
Yet being able to name the facial expression being displayed is not enough for successful social
interaction. It is also important to be able to tell whether a facial display matches a person’s
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underlying emotional experience (i.e., a genuine expression) or
not (i.e., a posed expression). Concerning this ability, previous
developmental studies have focused on happy facial expressions.
None have investigated any negative facial expressions using stim-
uli for which it has been confirmed that adults can discriminate
authenticity. Here we test for the first time children’s ability to
discriminate the authenticity of two negative facial expressions:
sadness and fear, as well as happiness.We also provide the first test
of the association between children’s authenticity discrimination
and perceived intensity of the expression across all three emotions.
Finally, we provide the first evidence of correlations between
individual differences in empathy and typical adults’ authen-
ticity discrimination ability, and test the same correlation in
children.
Genuine and Posed Expressions
Being able to tell the difference between genuine and posed facial
expressions is crucial to social interaction because the two types
of expression carry different meanings and imply different social
responses. For example, if a person sees someone they know
from school or work in a busy mall, a genuine smile might
signal an invitation to approach and chat, whereas a posed only-
being-polite smile might signal that further social interaction
is not wanted at this time. In another example concerning sad
expressions, not being able to tell the difference between gen-
uine and posed sadness might increase vulnerability to manip-
ulation: somebody showing a pretend sad expression could use
it to elicit help from somebody who cannot tell the sadness is
faked.
Genuine and posed expressions differ in several ways. The
fundamental and critical distinction is that genuine expressions
correspond with a congruent underlying emotion (e.g., smiling
when feeling happy, frowning when feeling angry), whereas posed
expressions do not. Here we investigate specifically the type of
posed expressions that are pretend, in which there is no strong
underlying experience of any emotion, such as smiling for a pho-
tograph, or playing pretend with a child whilst feeling emotionally
neutral. (Note these potentially differ from posed expressions that
are masked, in which the underlying emotion is incongruent with
the facial display, e.g., masking anger using a smile; Gosselin et al.,
2002a).
As a consequence of the differences in underlying emotional
experience, genuine and posed facial expressions may also differ
in their physical appearance, providing perceivers with some clues
about emotional authenticity. Although the nature of these phys-
ical differences is not yet fully understood, some differences have
been identified. One approach has been to use the Facial Action
Coding System (FACS; Ekman et al., 2002), which is a tool for
objectively measuring the degree of activation of different facial
muscle groups, termed action units (AUs). Genuine expressions
sometimes include so-called “reliable” AUs (Ekman, 2003), which
occur less often in posed expressions (Ekman et al., 1988), and
which people have less ability to control voluntarily (Mehu et al.,
2012; although note that some people are able to voluntarily
activate these AUs, Gunnery et al., 2012). The best established
of these is AU6 for happy, or the “Duchenne” marker, which
involves contraction of the orbicularis oculi muscle around the
eyes to form wrinkles. AU6 has been associated with genuine
happy expressions (e.g., Ekman et al., 1988; at least for Cau-
casians, Thibault et al., 2012). Reliable AUs for other emotions
are less well established, but for sadness the AU1+4 combination
(proposed by Ekman, 2003), which pulls the medial portion of
the brow upward and together, has recently been empirically
associated with genuine sadness (McLellan et al., 2010; although
see Mehu et al., 2012, who found observers associated AU23
with authentic sadness, and not AU1+4). Note that for fear, it
has not been empirically established in the literature what, if
any, are the reliable AUs for genuine fear (Ekman, 2003). In
addition to reliable AUs, other physical differences may include
symmetry and signs of arousal. Genuine expressions are thought
to be more symmetrical than posed expressions (Frank and
Ekman, 1993; Ekman, 2003), and may include physical signs
of arousal such as pupil dilation or skin “blushing” (Levenson,
2014), which are missing from pretend expressions because there
is minimal underlying emotional arousal. Finally, intensity (how
weak or strong the expression is) may potentially differ between
genuine and posed expressions, particularly for happy where
it has been suggested that a stronger underlying experience of
happiness results in a more intense facial display (Hess et al.,
1995).
Stimuli used in facial authenticity studies have been generated
in several different ways. For happy in particular, some researchers
have defined genuine happy expressions as any smile that includes
AU6, and pretend happy expressions as any smile that does not
include AU6 (e.g., Beaupré and Hess, 2003). Typically, these stim-
uli have been generated using actors who are able to voluntarily
activate AU6.However, whether these actors were feeling underly-
ing happiness is unknown and thus, although these stimuli mimic
the muscle AU characteristics of genuine and pretend happiness,
they may not include other physical markers of authenticity, such
as signs of arousal. Given this, we suggest it is also valuable to test
stimuli in which the emotional state of the photographed person
is known to correspond to the assigned status of the stimulus as
genuine versus posed.
For this reason, in the present study, we use genuine expres-
sion stimuli from McLellan and colleagues (e.g., McLellan et al.,
2010; see Figure 1 for examples). These stimuli were elicited in
a laboratory setting using procedures developed by Miles (2005).
For genuine expressions, emotions were elicited by looking at
emotional pictures, listening to emotional sounds (e.g., baby
laughing), or remembering an emotional event, and subsequently
were verified by self-report of the people who had displayed the
expressions to correspond with their underlying experience of
emotion. The McLellan stimuli also include pretend versions of
the same expressions, from the same models, which were elicited
by instructing stimulus models to pose or pretend a sad or fearful
face, fake a fearful reaction, or smile for a license photo, andwhich
were subsequently verified by self-report to have been generated
without any strong underlying experience of emotion. For the
happy and sad expressions, the genuine versions include AU6
(happy) or AU1+4 (sad), while these reliable-AU markers are
absent in the pretend versions. (For fear, reliable-AU status of the
stimuli cannot be determined given that reliable-AUs for fear have
not been established).
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FIGURE 1 | Examples of genuine and pretend (A) happy, (B) sad and (C) fear expressions (McLellan et al., 2010).
Adult Authenticity Discrimination Ability
for the McLellan Stimuli
For the present study, we wished to select stimuli, and emotions,
for which previous studies have found adult authenticity discrim-
ination performance was above chance (thus allowing the exami-
nation of developmental trends). For adults, five published studies
using stimuli from McLellan have tested whether observers can
distinguish genuine from pretend expressions (McLellan et al.,
2010, 2012; Johnston et al., 2011; Douglas et al., 2012; McLellan
and McKinley, 2013; note that all of these studies did not use
exactly the same stimulus items). Participants were instructed,
“Your job is to decide: : : whether or not they are [the person
shown is] feeling each emotion. For instance, sometimes when
people smile it does not necessarily mean that they are actually
feeling happy.” (McLellan et al., 2010, p. 1283). Participants were
then asked to give a yes/no response to the question “Are the
following people feeling [emotion]?” For happiness and sadness,
all five studies (McLellan et al., 2010, 2012; Johnston et al., 2011;
Douglas et al., 2012; McLellan and McKinley, 2013) found that
adults were significantly above chance at authenticity discrimina-
tion on this task (i.e.,more “yes” responses for genuine expressions
than for pretend expressions as indicated by A’, a non-parametric
signal detection score that combines hits and false alarms). For
fear, of the two studies that tested this emotion, the initial study
found significant if weak discrimination (McLellan et al., 2010),
although this was not replicated in a later study (which found
no discrimination; Douglas et al., 2012). For other expressions,
there have either been no tests of McLellan-type stimuli (anger,
surprise), or no evidence of above-chance authenticity discrimi-
nation in adults (e.g., disgust; Douglas et al., 2012). Overall then,
there is good evidence adults can discriminate the authenticity of
the McLellan happy and sad expression stimuli, with equivocal
evidence regarding fear expressions.
Previous Studies of Authenticity Discrimination
in Development
Turning to development, there is evidence even very young chil-
drenhave in place at least someof the abilities needed to determine
the genuineness of others’ emotional signals. Testing multimodal
signals of emotions—specifically, adults communicating an emo-
tion simultaneously through facial expression, body gestures, and
voice—Walle and Campos (2014) showed that 19-month-olds
can detect incongruency between the emotional display and the
context of the rest of an event (e.g., a parent displaying pain, while
hitting a hammer not on their finger but on the table nearby;
although note that certain aspects of emotion–context interac-
tions are notmature even by 12 years of age, Dawel et al., 2015) and
can detect incongruency between two successive emotions (e.g.,
an actress displaying disgust followed immediately by happiness).
These infants also showed sensitivity to whether a multimodal
expression of fear was of normal versus exaggerated intensity.
Importantly, however, in the Walle and Campos (2014) study all
scenarios were acted (i.e., all facial expressions were likely posed
rather than genuinely-felt) and the study concerned ability to dis-
cern authenticity-related information from multimodal stimuli,
not facial information alone, which is the focus of the present
investigation.
Studies that have tested specifically the ability to determine
the authenticity of facial expressions, by contrasting genuine and
posed versions of the expression, have tested children rather
than infants. We are aware of six such studies. Five tested happy
expressions, but only one tested any other emotion.
For happy, four studies varied authenticity by creating stimuli
using the AU6 present–absent method (Gosselin et al., 2002b,
2010; Del Giudice and Colle, 2007; Thibault et al., 2009). One
used happy faces created using theMiles/McLellan method where
the subjective feelings of the photographed person are known
(Blampied et al., 2010). Results of both methods agree that chil-
dren can discriminate happy authenticity above chance from
as young as 4 years of age, but do not reach adult levels of
performance even by 16–17 years of age. Two of these studies
also investigated the physical cues that children use to achieve
authenticity discrimination in happy faces. Thibault et al. (2009)
used smile stimuli that varied in intensity of the smile, and were
also either with, or without, the reliable-AU marker for genuine
happy AU6. From their data, Thibault et al. (2009) concluded that
children from 4 years of age used intensity of the expression to
judge authenticity, and also the presence of AU6. Del Giudice and
Colle (2007) examined the relationship between 8-year-olds’ judg-
ments of smile authenticity and FACS-coded AU intensity. This
study found that expressions were judged by 8-year-olds as more
authentic if they included bare-teethed smiles (AU25), stronger
activation of AU6, and/or stronger activation of the “lid tightener”
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(AU7), which is easily confusable with AU6. Their results suggest
that it may not be not the presence of AU6 per se that children
use to judge smile authenticity, but rather the increased inten-
sity of the expression that is associated with activation of AU6
(or AU7).
For other emotions, the only previous study videoed children’s
genuine reactions to “disliked” stimuli (most commonly pro-
ducing expressions of disgust, e.g., tasting a salty drink; Soppe,
1988). Child observers (6–12 year olds) could not discriminate
these above chance from pretend dislike reactions to neutral
stimuli. Unfortunately, this finding is difficult to interpret as evi-
dence regarding developmental trends because adults also could
not discriminate authenticity of the same stimuli. Thus overall,
there have been no studies that have tested children’s ability
to discriminate emotion authenticity of negative facial expres-
sions forwhich adults have successfully demonstrated authenticity
discrimination.
Present Study
The primary aimof the present studywas to provide the first test of
children’s ability to discriminate the authenticity of two negative
facial expressions, sad and fear, as well as happy expressions, in
8–12 year olds relative to adults.We tested 8–12 year olds because,
by 8 years of age, children have a good conceptual understand-
ing of the difference between genuine and pretend expressions
(Sidera et al., 2011). We tested sad and fearful expressions specif-
ically because these were the only two negative expressions for
which we were able to obtain genuine-pretend stimulus pairs
from the same identity models (created using the Miles/McLellan
method), and for which adults had already demonstrated ability
to discriminate authenticity (for sad, consistently above chance in
five studies), or at least some evidence of ability to discriminate
authenticity (for fear, above chance in one out of the two previous
studies). We also included happy faces because it is well estab-
lished that children of the age tested here can discriminate their
authenticity, which allowed us to use happy to validate our task
(i.e., children’s above-chance performance for happy expressions
would help us to establish that children understood the task). We
used a task that presents pairs of faces, rather than individual
faces (e.g., as in Blampied et al., 2010; McLellan et al., 2010),
to minimize task demands for children (Gosselin et al., 2010).
In our two-alternative-forced-choice (2-AFC) paradigm, partic-
ipants were shown pairs of genuine and pretend expressions from
the same model and asked to decide which of the pair was “only
pretending.”
A second aim of the present study was to obtain information
relevant to understanding the strategies children use to discrim-
inate authenticity, and particularly the extent to which they rely
only on intensity of the facial expression, or a combination of
intensity and other factors. Previous studies of this question
have examined only the expression of happy. Here, we examine
relationships between authenticity discrimination and perceived
expression intensity, across all three expressions of happy, sad, and
fear, to determine the contribution of intensity to children’s judg-
ments of authenticity more broadly, beyond just the expression of
happy. In addition, the analysis we use (see Results) allows us to
determine whether children, and adults, demonstrate significant
use of cues beyond intensity. Note that our stimuli do not, in gen-
eral, allowus to define the specific nature of such cues (e.g., towhat
extent they include reliable-AUs versus other physical differences
that might be present between the genuine and posed McLellan
faces). Certain outcome possibilities, however, would allow us
to draw some limited conclusions regarding other cues (e.g., for
sad, the genuine but not posed expressions contain AU1+4; thus,
a finding that, say, adults can discriminate authenticity of these
stimuli above chance while children cannot would imply that
children do not use this reliable-AU).
Our final aim was to examine associations between authentic-
ity discrimination ability and individual differences in empathy.
This is a largely novel question even in adults, and has not
previously been tested at all in children. That there might be
such an association is suggested by some theoretical models of
empathy that link perception and action, so that by perceiving
another’s situation the observer creates some kind of simulation,
either through emotional or motoric representation, of the other’s
situation that results in sharing of their emotional experience
[e.g., theories that empathy is derived from emotional contagion,
see Maibom, 2012; or the perception-action model of empa-
thy (PAM), Preston and de Waal, 2002]. These theories do not
specifically discuss a relationship between empathy and ability to
determine authenticity of facial emotion, but do make it plausible
that such an association could exist. For example, we suggest an
association with authenticity discrimination might arise from a
simulation process either because people with greater simula-
tion abilities might be better at discriminating between genuine
and pretend expressions because they experience an especially
strong emotional experience in response to genuine expressions
(predicting a positive correlation), or, in the opposite direction,
that they might be worse at authenticity discrimination because
they experience an indiscriminately strong emotional experience
to both genuine and pretend expressions (predicting a negative
correlation; Manera et al., 2013). These predictions regarding
simulation appear to relate more specifically to the affective com-
ponent of empathy—the extent to which a person is emotionally
responsive to others’ experiences (e.g., the extent to which they
feel sad, sympathetic or distressed because a friend is crying).
In the present study, we also examine cognitive empathy—the
ability to infer what another person is thinking and feeling from
physical cues in the face and body, contextual information, and
knowledge of the person (e.g., using a frown to infer that someone
is angry; see Maibom, 2012). As cognitive and affective empathy
are at least partly independent facets (Jolliffe and Farrington, 2006;
Dadds et al., 2008), we examined them separately. Concerning
predictions for cognitive empathy, we suggest that, potentially,
observers could use cognitive strategies (e.g., explicit knowledge of
the AU6 marker or arousal cues) to infer authenticity, predicting
a positive correlation between cognitive empathy and authen-
ticity discrimination. Regarding previous empirical tests, we are
aware of only one previous study that has examined associations
between empathy and authenticity discrimination in adults (but
cf. Manera et al., 2013, for study of associations between emo-
tional contagion and authenticity discrimination). McLellan and
McKinley (2013) found a positive correlation between empathy
(affective and cognitive components combined) and authenticity
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discrimination within a clinical traumatic brain injury group;
however, this correlation was not significant within neurologically
healthy controls with a small sample size (n = 19). Here, we re-
examine this association within typically developing adults and,
for the first time, test it in children.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Participants analyzed were 85 children (Mage = 10.0 years,
SDage= 1.1, age range= 8.3–12.3, 46 females) and 57 young adults
(Mage = 19.3, SDage = 2.2, age range = 17–27, 40 females). All
participants were Caucasian, to match the race of face stimuli,
because there are race-related cultural differences in the percep-
tion of expression authenticity (e.g., some non-Caucasian cultures
do not interpret AU6 as a sign of genuine happiness; Thibault
et al., 2012). Adults were recruited via fliers posted around campus
at the Australian National University. Children were from two
local primary schools, and were recruited by having the schools
send letters home to all parents in the class requesting their
child’s participation in the study. All participants were reported
to have normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Informed, written
consent was obtained from adult participants and from the par-
ents of child participants. Verbal assent was also obtained from
child participants. Adults were paid $15 per hour for their par-
ticipation, or given undergraduate course credit. Children were
rewarded with certificates and stickers. This study was approved
by, and conducted in accordance with the guidelines of, the
Human Research Ethics Committee at The Australian National
University. Additionally, for children, approval for the study was
obtained from the ACT Government Education and Training
Directorate.
We excluded data from seven additional participants who, on a
screening questionnaire, reported major disorders that can affect
face processing (e.g., brain injury, Autism, etc.). These were five
children reported by parents to have an intellectual impairment
(1), ADHD or ADD (3), or Aspergers disorder (1), and two adults
who reported epilepsy (1) or severe migraines with aura (1).
Session Structure and Order of Tasks
Participants were tested in a single session lasting up to one hour
(children) or one and a half hours (adults, extra time was for
completing questionnaires and, for the first n = 26 adults tested,
the emotion labeling and intensity rating tasks). Tasks reported
in the present article were completed as part of a larger battery,
but always in the following order: basic emotion labeling task (i.e.,
categorizing the facial expression as happy, sad, etc.); authenticity
discrimination task; intensity rating task (adults only; note that
children’s ratings of affective stimuli tend correlate highly with
adults’ ratings, rs > 0.82; McManis et al., 2001); and finally
demographic, screening, and empathy questionnaires (for adults;
for children the questionnaires were completed by parents prior
to the session). Experimental tasks were run using Macintosh
computers. Faces were presented on an attached ELO IntelliTouch
touchscreen with screen size 15” and resolution 1024 768, using
Superlab version 4.0 software. Participants responded by touching
the screen.
Facial Expression Stimuli
Examples of the facial expression stimuli are shown in Figure 1.
Stimuli were genuine and pretend versions of happy, sad and fear
expressions. In total, therewere 12 genuine-pretend pairs; 4 happy,
4 sad, and 4 fearful (24 face images total). The stimuli were pro-
vided by McLellan (personal communication, 2011), comprising
a set that largely overlapped with that used by McLellan et al.
(2010), and all were created in themanner described in that article
[i.e., following Miles (2005) as described in the final paragraph of
“Genuine and Posed Expressions” in our Introduction]. Genuine
and pretend versions of each emotion were displayed by four
female stimulus models (all three expressions = 1 model; happy
and sad = 2 models; happy and fear = 1 model; sad only = 1
model; fear only= 2models). Stimulusmodels were from the gen-
eral population, and did not have any specific training. Faces were
displayed centrally, and subtended 5.5  7.3°visual angle (4.8 cm
wide  6.4 cm high at the viewing distance of approximately
50 cm).
Emotion Labeling
The 24 happy, sad and fear face stimuli were presented indi-
vidually in random order for each participant, intermixed with
16 additional images displaying genuine and pretend anger and
disgust expressions to make the labeling task a 5-choice response
(total stimuli = 40 faces). (Anger and disgust stimuli were
also provided by McLellan and colleagues; note these were not
included in our authenticity discrimination task). The task was
to indicate what expression each face was displaying by choosing
from the five emotion labels presented onscreen (angry, disgusted,
scared, happy, sad). Faces were displayed until response. There
were five practice trials (one for each emotion label) showing
cartoon characters from The Simpsons. All children and a sub-
sample of the first 26 of the 57 adults completed the labeling task
(Mage = 19.7 years, SDage = 2.8, age range = 17–27, 16 females).
The task was exactly the same for children and adults.
Prior to starting the labeling task, we verified children under-
stood the meaning of the emotion labels. Children were asked
for each emotion, “Tell me what happy (or sad, etc.) means or
when you might feel happy (or sad, etc.).” All children provided
explanations that were consistent with themeaning of the emotion
labels (e.g., for happy: “if something goes your way or if you get
something that you like”). Children were then read five brief sto-
ries fromWiden andRussell (2002) depicting scenarios that would
be likely to elicit each of the five emotions, and asked “How do you
think [the child in the story] is feeling?”All children verbalized the
correct emotion label or a synonym for that emotion for each story
(e.g., some children gave the label “afraid” instead of “scared” for
the fear story).
Authenticity Discrimination Task
The authenticity discrimination task is illustrated inFigure 2. Two
images of the same person were presented one after the other
for 2000 ms each, with a blank interstimulus interval of 500 ms.
One image showed a genuine happy, sad, or fear expression and
the other image showed a pretend version of the same emotional
expression. Participants were instructed that the two images were
of twins, and that “The twins are playing a trick on you. One twin
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FIGURE 2 | Trial sequence for authenticity discrimination task (happy example shown here; correct answer = 2nd twin was only pretending). Adapted
from McLellan et al. (2010).
really feels happy, scared, or sad, but the other is only pretending!
Your job is to decide which twin is only pretending.” The task was
exactly the same for children and adults, with the exception that,
following these initial instructions, children were also asked what
“pretending” means. All children were able to give a synonym
(e.g., “faking”) and/or an example of pretend behavior.
Each trial started by asking, “Which twin is only pretend-
ing to be happy about the present (or sad about the rain, or
scared of the spider)?” To ensure participants were looking at
the screen they were required to press an object to start each
trial (happy = present; sad = rain cloud; fear = spider). After
viewing the two face images, participants responded by touch-
ing one of two boxes shown side-by-side onscreen, labeled “‘1st
twin” and “‘2nd twin,” to indicate which twin they thought was
only pretending to be happy, sad, or scared. Prior to starting the
task, all participants completed three practice trials (one each for
happy, sad, and scared) showing cartoon characters from The
Simpsons. The “twin” images were shown consecutively, rather
than together, to ensure participants had the same amount of time
to scan each face. The order of genuine and pretend versions of
each emotion was counterbalanced across trials (e.g., so the 1st
twin displayed genuine happiness in two of the four happy trials,
and the 2nd twin displayed genuine happiness in the other two
trials). Trial order was randomized for each participant (trials per
emotion= 4, total trials= 12).
Intensity Rating Task
Intensity ratings were from the same subsample of adults who
completed the emotion labeling task (n = 26). Participants
were instructed, “Your next task is to rate the intensity of each
facial expression, from weak to strong.” Each face was presented
individually onscreen, in random order, with the statement,
“Please rate the intensity of this facial expression,” and a scale
numbering from 1 (labeled “weak”) to 9 (labeled “strong”). (Note
the intensity rating task also included the anger and disgust
expressions).
Empathy Questionnaires
Empathy was measured for children using the Griffith Empa-
thy Measure (GEM; Dadds et al., 2008) and in adults using the
Basic Empathy Scale (BES; Jolliffe and Farrington, 2006). These
measures were selected because: (1) they each have a two-factor
structure in which one factor taps affective empathy and the other
cognitive empathy, and (2) they are well matched across the child
and adult measures in terms of the number of items that refer to
negatively valenced emotions, positively-valenced emotions, and
to “feelings” generally without specifying valence (see Table 1).
TheGEM is a 23-item parent reportmeasure, with items scored
from  4 (strongly disagree) to +4 (strongly agree). Both factors
demonstrate good to acceptable reliability (current sample: affec-
tive a= 0.81; cognitive a= 0.50; note the cognitive subscale only
has six items, and Cronbach’s a tends to underestimate reliability
when there are small numbers of items; Schmitt, 1996). Concern-
ing validity, parent ratings on theGEMhave been demonstrated to
correlate positively with direct observations of children’s empathic
behavior and with questionnaire measures of prosocial behavior
(Dadds et al., 2008).
The BES is a 20-item self-report measure that uses a 5-point
Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Both
factors demonstrate good reliability (current sample: affective
a = 0.89; cognitive a = 0.77). Concerning validity, each factor
correlates aswould be expectedwith other questionnairemeasures
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TABLE 1 | Number of items by valence for the affective and cognitive subscales of the GEM (children) and the BES (adults).
Griffith empathy measure (GEM) Basic empathy scale (BES)
No. of items Example No. of items Example
Affective subscale
Negative valence 7 My child gets upset when another person is
acting upset.
7 After being with a friend who is sad about
something, I usually feel sad.
Positive valence 1 My child acts happy when another person is
happy.
0 –
Unspecified valence 1 My child seems to react to the moods of
people around him/her.
4 I get caught up in other people’s feelings easily.
Cognitive subscale
Negative valence 4 When I get sad my child doesn’t seem to
notice.
4 When someone is feeling “down” I can usually
understand how they feel.
Positive valence 2 My child doesn’t understand when other
people cry out of happiness.
3 I can usually work out when people are
cheerful.
Unspecified valence 0 – 2 I can often understand how people are feeling
even before they tell me.
of empathy and of personality traits (e.g., positive correlation
with agreeableness; Jolliffe and Farrington, 2006; Baldner and
McGinley, 2014).
Results
Given that we had no specific predictions for individual emotions,
all significance tests throughout the Results that report individual
emotions are post hoc and all p-values are Bonferroni corrected
(for the three emotions). Also, all significance tests are two-tailed.
Authenticity discrimination scores (Figure 3) were calculated
as proportion correct (i.e., the proportion of trials on which the
participant correctly chose the pretend expression as the one
“just pretending”). Initial ANOVA revealed a two-way interaction
between age group (adult, child) and face emotion (happy, sad,
fear), F(2,280) = 5.87, MSE = 0.08, p = 0.003, which established
the pattern of authenticity discrimination ability across the three
emotions was significantly different for adults and children. Thus
we analyze adults and children separately.
Adults
Results are displayed by the dark bars in Figure 3A. A one-way
ANOVA on adults’ authenticity discrimination scores revealed a
significant effect of face emotion, F(2,112) = 42.28, MSE = 0.07,
p < 0.001, which established that adults’ authenticity discrimina-
tion ability differed across the three emotions. Follow-up t-tests
revealed that adults’ ability to discriminate the authenticity of
expressions was significantly better for happy than for sad expres-
sions, Mhappy = 0.89, Msad = 0.68, t(56) = 4.18, p < 0.001, and
was also significantly better for sad than for fear expressions,
Mfear = 0.43, t(56) = 5.06, p< 0.001.
It was also theoretically important to establish whether authen-
ticity discrimination was above chance (0.5). Using one-sample
t-tests we found that, consistent with previous studies using
similar stimuli (e.g.,McLellan et al., 2010, 2012; Johnston et al.,
2011; Douglas et al., 2012; McLellan and McKinley, 2013), adults
were able to successfully discriminate the authenticity of happy,
t(56) = 12.08, p < 0.001, and sad expressions, t(56) = 4.09,
p < 0.001. For fearful expressions, authenticity discrimination
was slightly below chance but not significantly so, t(56) = 2.22,
p = 0.061. Overall, these results indicate that adults could not
discriminate the authenticity of the fear expressions, but could
discriminate the authenticity of the happy and sad expressions,
and that they were better at this for happy than for sad.
Children
Results are displayed by the light bars in Figure 3A. A one-way
ANOVA on children’s authenticity discrimination scores revealed
a significant effect of face emotion, F(2,168)= 32.37, MSE= 0.09,
p< 0.001, which established that authenticity discrimination abil-
ity differed across the three emotions. Follow-up t-tests revealed
that, like adults, children showed better ability to discriminate
the authenticity of happy than of sad expressions, Mhappy = 0.77,
Msad = 0.46, t(84) = 6.36, p < 0.001. Unlike adults, however,
there was no significant difference between children’s authenticity
discrimination scores for sad and fear expressions, Mfear = 0.46,
t(84)= 0.227, p= 1.0.
Comparison of children’s authenticity discrimination scores
to chance (0.5) for each emotion using one-sample t-tests also
showed that, like adults, children were able to successfully dis-
criminate the authenticity of happy, t(56) = 8.93, p < 0.001, and
not of fearful expressions, t(56)= 1.61, p= 0.224, but that, unlike
adults, childrenwere unable to discriminate the authenticity of sad
expressions, t(56) = 1.12, p= 0.474.
Finally, it was also important to compare children to adults.
This must be done separately for individual emotions (due to the
original emotion  age group 2-way interaction, which indicates
developmental improvement varies across emotions). Results
showed there was no age-related change in authenticity discrim-
ination accuracy for fear expressions, t(140) = 1.56, p = 0.602,
but that children performed significantly more poorly than adults
for happy and sad expressions, happy: t(140) = 2.46, p = 0.015;
sad: t[106.1(equal variances not assumed) = 4.04, p < 0.001].
Importantly, children’s poorer authenticity discrimination for
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FIGURE 3 | Mean authenticity discrimination scores for (A) children compared to adults and (B) children by years of age. Error bars =  1 SEM
(Standard Error of the Mean).
FIGURE 4 | Mean proportion correct for emotion labeling task for
children compared to adults, for genuine and pretend happy, sad and
fear expressions. Labeling items were scored as correct if participants
selected the label that McLellan and colleagues had ascribed to a stimulus
(personal communication, 2011). Note, overall fear labeling accuracy was
lower than for other emotions for both age groups, but this is a typical finding
(e.g., Palermo and Coltheart, 2004). Error bars =  1 SEM.
happy and sad expressions could not be explained by any inability
to label these expressions (Figure 4). Children’s labeling accuracy
for sad expressions was statistically equivalent to that of adults,
Mchild = 0.83, Madult = 0.86, F(1, 109) = 0.574, MSE = 0.060,
p = 0.450, and for happy expressions was slightly better than
that of adults, Mchild = 0.99, Madult = 0.97, F(1, 109) = 6.95,
MSE= 0.004, p= 0.010, irrespective of whether expressions were
genuine or pretend (no significant interaction between age group
and expression authenticity for happy or sad expressions, both
ps> 0.222).
Overall, results for children showed they were able to dis-
criminate the authenticity of happy expressions, but not of sad
(or fearful) expressions, and that even in the case of happy expres-
sions children did not perform as well as adults.
Does Authenticity Discrimination Improve from
8 to 12 Years of Age?
Figure 3B illustrates that, for all three emotions, children showed
no improvement in their ability to discriminate the authenticity
of expressions with age (i.e., the 8-year-old white bars on the left
for each emotion are comparable with the darker grey bars for
older children on the right). Supporting this conclusion, linear
trend analysis on mean authenticity discrimination score across
age in years (8 year olds, 9 year olds, 10 year olds, and 11-
and 12-year-olds combined for sufficient sample size) showed no
significant change with age for any of the three emotions, happy:
F(1,81) = 0.98, MSE = 0.08, p = 0.326; sad: F(1,81) = 0.11,
MSE = 0.08, p = 0.739, fear: F(1,81) = 1.25, MSE = 0.06,
p= 0.266.
Intensity
Our results show that children are not able to discriminate the
authenticity of sad expressions at all, and are less able than adults
to discriminate the authenticity of happy expressions. This raises
the question of whether children and adults use different strate-
gies to discriminate authenticity. We tested the extent to which
children rely on expression intensity to judge authenticity, as
opposed to also using additional cues in the face (e.g., reliable
AUs; Thibault et al., 2009, 2012), across all three of the expressions
we tested (happy, sad, fear; note the previous studies of Thibault
et al., 2009, and Del Giudice and Colle, 2007, examined variations
in intensity within happy only). Note that our method and anal-
yses are designed to establish (1) the contribution of intensity to
authenticity discrimination and (2) if additional cues contribute.
They are not intended to establish what these additional cues are.
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TABLE 2 | Mean intensity ratings (n= 26 adults) for genuine and pretend
versions of each emotional expression, with SDs in parentheses.
Genuine Pretend
Happy Sad Fear Happy Sad Fear
7.18 4.55 5.13 5.32 5.07 6.25
(1.2) (1.2) (1.0) (1.6) (1.2) (1.0)
Scale = 1 to 9, with higher number indicating the expression is stronger (more intense).
Scores are averaged over the four items in each category (e.g., the four genuine happy
face items).
FIGURE 5 | Mean intensity ratings (n= 26) for individual stimulus pairs
(e.g., Happy Pair 1= genuine and posed happy expressions shown by
the same person). Error bars =  1 SEM.
We first examined the mean intensity ratings for our stimulus
items from the three emotions, shown in Table 2 averaged across
emotions and in Figure 5 for individual stimulus pairs. These
values are potentially consistent with the idea that children (and
adults) judge authenticity based on the intensity of the expression,
such that they perceive the more intense expression of each trial
pair as the more genuine, and the less intense as less genuine
(more likely to be pretend). Specifically, for happy—the expres-
sion for which children were able to reliably discriminate authen-
ticity—comparison of mean ratings showed the genuine items we
used were on average significantly more intense than the pretend
items, t(25)= 7.65, p< 0.001. For sad, however, the genuine items
and pretend items did not differ significantly in average intensity,
t(25)= 1.54, p= 0.137; and for these stimuli childrenwere not able
to discriminate authenticity above chance (while adults could).
Finally, for fear, the pretend items were significantly more intense
overall than the genuine items, t(25) = 5.55, p < 0.001; and
for these stimuli even adults could not discriminate authenticity
above chance (indeed, they showed a trend in the opposite direc-
tion, i.e., toward perceiving the pretend item as more authentic
than the genuine one).
Taking this intensity analysis one step further, we then exam-
ined correlations between authenticity discrimination perfor-
mance and intensity of individual items. Note our use of paired
stimuli (for 2-AFC) for the authenticity trials requires a somewhat
complicated way to analyze the data (i.e., we cannot just plot
discrimination accuracy against intensity of the face, since there
were two faces presented on each trial). In Figure 6, we illustrate
the format of our data plots. On the x-axis, we plot the difference
in mean intensity ratings for each genuine-pretend pair. On this
scale: a score of zero indicates that the genuine and pretend items
on the trial were of equal intensity; a score to the right of zero
indicates that the genuine face was more intense than the pretend
face; and a score to the left of zero indicates that the pretend face
was more intense than the genuine face. On the y-axis, we plot
authenticity discrimination accuracy (mean across participants),
for each individual face pair (12 pairs in total).
In Figures 6A–C, we illustrate how various results outcomes
would correspond to evidence of using different types of strategies.
In particular, we test whether a given age group is using: (a)
intensity only (Figure 6A); (b) other strategies only (Figure 6B),
such asmaking use of the reliableAUs (AU6 for happy andAU1+4
for sad) that are present in the genuine versions and absent in the
pretend versions, or making use of affective empathy responses;
or (c) a combination of intensity and other strategies (Figure 6C).
First, in Figure 6A, if intensity is an important driver of which
member of the pair is perceived as authentic, we would expect to
observe a positive-slope relationship.Here, pairs inwhich the gen-
uine face is the more intense item would tend to produce higher
authenticity decision accuracy (i.e., participants are more likely to
correctly perceive the genuine face as the genuine one), and pairs
in which the pretend face is themore intense item tend to produce
lower authenticity decision accuracy (i.e., participants are more
likely to incorrectly perceive the pretend face as the genuine one).
Moreover, if participants are using only intensity to determine
authenticity, then we would expect the line of best fit to pass
through (0, 0.5): that is, when the two faces in the stimulus pair
are equal in intensity (zero on the x-axis), we would expect partic-
ipants to perform at chance (0.5) in authenticity discrimination.
Second, in Figure 6B, if only other strategies drive percepts of
authenticity, with no role for intensity, then we would observe
a flat line relationship with the line of best fit set at above-
chance discrimination (y-intercept significantly above 0.5 on the
authenticity discrimination scale). This is because the lack of a role
for intensity would leave no association with that variable (i.e., a
flat slope), and the contribution of the other factor/s would give
above-chance discrimination (including when intensity is equal
for the genuine and pretend faces, i.e., at the y-axis where intensity
difference is zero).
Finally, if both intensity and other strategies were being used
in combination, we would expect the pattern illustrated in
Figure 6C. Here, there is a positive-slope relationship indicat-
ing a contribution of intensity, and simultaneously an above-0.5
y-intercept value indicating a contribution from other factor/s.
Note this is different from the pattern in Figure 6A, in which the
y-intercept is 0.5 indicating authenticity discrimination is related
exclusively to intensity.
We present the actual results in Figure 6D (children) and
Figure 6E (adults). For both age groups, authenticity discrimi-
nation was significantly positively related to expression intensity
(slope of regression line for children: b = 0.105, b = 0.823,
t(11) = 4.58, p = 0.001; for adults: b = 0.113, b = 0.756,
t(11) = 3.65, p = 0.004), arguing that both children and adults
used intensity as a cue to authenticity across the three expressions.
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FIGURE 6 | (A–C) show predicted pattern of results if, to discriminate expression authenticity, participants (A) rely exclusively on intensity, or (B) use some other
cue/s and not intensity information, or (C) combine intensity information with other cue/s. (D) Results for children (n = 85) indicate they use intensity information with
no significant contribution of other factors. (E) Results for adults (n = 57) indicate they also use intensity information, but that they combine intensity with some other
cue/s to boost their performance above that of children. “Difference in intensity ratings” is the difference in mean rating, for each stimulus pair (n = 12 pairs),
averaged across 26 adult participants (e.g., mean intensity rating for a genuine happy stimulus face minus the mean intensity rating for the corresponding pretend
happy stimulus with which it appeared on the 2-AFC trial). Authenticity discrimination scores were averaged across participants for each stimulus pair. H1 = happy
stimulus pair number 1, H2 = happy stimulus pair number 2, and so on for sad (S) and fear (F).
Moreover, comparison of slopes across the two age groups indi-
cated that there was no evidence of any difference in children’s
compared to adults’ sensitivity to intensity; that is, the child slope
of b = 0.105 was not significantly less steep than the adult slope
of b = 0.113, t(20) = 0.20, p = 0.838 (parallel slopes shown in
Figure 6E).
Where children differed from adults was in the y-intercept.
For children, when the genuine and pretend expressions in the
pair were of equal intensity, the regression line intercepted the
y-axis at a point not significantly different from chance levels of
authenticity discrimination [intercept = 0.557, t(11) = 1.68, with
p = 0.122 for comparison to chance value of 0.5]. Thus in the
absence of diagnostic intensity information children were unable
to discriminate authenticity above chance (consistent with the
earlier analysis for sad-expression items treated as a group). In
comparison, Figure 6E shows that the regression line for adults
is moved up relative to children’s, and crosses the y-axis signif-
icantly above chance levels of authenticity discrimination [inter-
cept = 0.657, t(11) = 3.41, p = 0.006 for comparison to chance
value of 0.5]. This result argues that adults used, in addition to
intensity, some other cue or cues to improve their discrimination
of authenticity.
While the size of our stimuli set for the intensity ratings was
small (n= 12 stimulus pairs) and we only used adult’s estimates of
intensity differences, overall these analyses are consistent with the
view that children’s percepts of authenticity were driven primarily
by intensity of the expression, while adults judge authenticity
using intensity in combination with other factors. Concerning the
nature of these other factor/s, note that our adult results do not
directly demonstrate that adults used the presence versus absence
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TABLE 3 | Reliability for measures used in individual differences analyses.
Number of items Reliability coefficient1
Children (n = 85)
Empathy
GEMaffective 9 0.81
GEMcognitive 6 0.50
GEMnegative valence 11 0.84
GEMpositive valence 3 0.47
Authenticity discrimination
Happy 4 0.61
Adults (n = 57)
Empathy
BESaffective 11 0.89
BEScognitive 9 0.77
BESnegative valence 11 0.81
BESpositive valence 3 0.75
Authenticity discrimination
Happy 4 0.75
Sad 4 0.66
1For scales with >3 items we report Cronbach’s a; however, a tends to underestimate
reliability when there are small numbers of items (Schmitt, 1996) so for the 3-item scales
we report the Spearman-Brown coefficient (Eisinga et al., 2013).
of reliable AUs, although the results are at least consistent with this
view in that our stimuli had reliable AUs present in the genuine
version (and absent in the pretend version) for the two emotions
that adults could discriminate above chance (happy and sad),
but not necessarily for the emotion adults could not discriminate
(fear). For children, however, our results do directly support the
view that this age group did not use the reliable-AU combination
of AU1+4 as a cue to authenticity for sad faces: if they did so,
then their mean performance for sad faces would have to be above
chance, which was not the case (see Children).
Empathy
We next examined correlations between individual differences in
empathy and authenticity discrimination ability, for those emo-
tions where performance was above chance. Reliability analyses
are reported in Table 3 and correlational results in Table 4. Note
that for conditions where mean authenticity discrimination was
at chance (fear for adults, sad and fear for children), individual
differences in performance are notmeaningful (i.e., they are taken
to reflect merely guessing), and so correlations with empathy are
not reported.
For adults, there were significant positive correlations (i.e.,
higher empathy was associated with better ability to discrimi-
nate authenticity) for happy expressions. This was true for both
affective empathy, t = 0.309, p = 0.004, and cognitive empathy,
t = 0.352, p = 0.001 (note all correlations involving happy in
this article report the non-parametric Kendall’s t due to a skewed
distribution of authenticity discrimination scores for this expres-
sion). In an additional analysis, we divided the adult empathy
questionnaire (BES) into items that referred to negative emotions
and positive emotions (excluding items in which the emotional
valence was not specified; see Table 4). This was because Manera
et al. (2013) reported that better authenticity discrimination was
related to susceptibility to emotional contagion (one aspect of
empathy; Maibom, 2012) only for contagion from negative emo-
tions, while susceptibility to emotional contagion from positive
emotions was related to worse authenticity discrimination (note
the results were for happy-face authenticity only; other expres-
sionswere not tested).However, in the present studywe found that
both negative-valence and positive-valence BES scores showed
significant positive correlations with authenticity discrimination
for happy expressions (BESnegative valence: t = 0.342, p = 0.002;
BESpositive valence: t= 0.383, p= 0.001). That is, we found in adults
that better authenticity discrimination of happinesswas associated
with greater BES empathy, irrespective of the emotional valence of
measurement items.
In contrast, for children we found no significant correlations
with empathy (Table 4), specifically including trivially small cor-
relations for happy (i.e., the expression for which significant
correlations were present for adults). Note this lack of correlation
cannot be attributed to uninteresting explanations such as lack of
range: the children’s happy-face authenticity scores had if anything
more range than the adults’ (SDchildren = 0.28, SDadults = 0.24),
and the children’s empathy scores covered a wide range of values
compared to norms (for total GEM, M = 34.32, SD = 18.94,
compared to M = 35.03, SD = 21.7 for n = 1034 7–10 year olds;
Dadds et al., 2008).
Finally, we examined whether sex differences might play a role
in the empathy correlations found in adults. This issue arose
because (a) empathy was positively related to being female in our
adult sample (affective empathy: r = 0.587, p < 0.001; cognitive
empathy r = 0.299, p < 0.05; replicating previous findings, for
review see Eisenberg and Lennon, 1983), and (b) at the same
time, we found that authenticity discrimination was also better in
females. Including participant sex in a global ANOVA[sex facial
emotion  age group (children vs. adults)] on authenticity scores
revealed a significant interaction between sex and face emotion,
F(2, 276) = 7.04, MSE = 0.076, p = 0.001. This interaction is
illustrated in Figure 7, where it can be seen that females showed
an advantage over males in authenticity discrimination for happy
faces, but not sad or fear faces. Collapsing over age group [noting
that the ANOVA showed no significant interactions involving sex
and age group: 2-way sex  age, F(1, 138) = 0.56, MSE = 0.056,
p = 0.456; 3-way sex  age  emotion, F(2, 276) = 2.29,
MSE = 0.076, p = 0.103], there were no sex differences for either
sad or fear expressions, both ps > 0.498. However, for happy, the
female advantage was significant, Mfemales = 0.90, Mmales = 0.70,
t[75.6(equal variances not assumed)= 3.94, p< 0.001]. This raises
the possibility that the significant empathy correlations for adults
were in fact driven by sex differences. To rule out this possibility,
we re-ran correlations using only female participants. (There were
insufficient males in our adult sample to look at males separately).
These female-only analyses (right side of Table 4) replicated the
finding of a significant relationship between authenticity discrim-
ination for happy expressions and empathy in adults (affective
empathy, t = 0.277, p = 0.040, cognitive empathy, t = 0.334,
p = 0.015), and not in children, indicating that our empathy
findings were not due to sex effects.
Overall, empathy results indicate that individual differences in
empathy were correlated with ability to discriminate authenticity
for happy expressions in adults, but not in children, and not for sad
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TABLE 4 | Correlations between empathy and authenticity discrimination scores (for emotions where mean performance was above chance).
All participants1 Females only
Children (n = 85) Adults (n = 57) Children (n = 46) Adults (n = 40)
Happy1 Happy1 Sad Happy1 Happy1 Sad
Affective empathy 0.053 0.309**  0.119 0.084 0.277*  0.255
Cognitive empathy2  0.004 0.352**  0.108 0.015 0.334**  0.118
Positively-valenced3 0.038 0.383**  0.067  0.018 0.346*  0.011
Negatively-valenced2,3 0.083 0.342**  0.106 0.105 0.352*  0.155
Empathy was measured in children using the GEM and in adults using the BES. Correlations for fear for both age groups and for sad for children are not presented because mean
performance was at chance and, correspondingly, internal reliability was extremely low. 1Kendall’s t is reported for correlations involving happy authenticity discrimination scores,
because this variable was strongly negatively skewed. Pearson’s r is reported for all other correlations. 2Correlations with the GEM cognitive subscale and the GEM positively-valenced
subscale should be interpreted with caution due to the low reliability of these subscales, but are presented here for completeness. 3Positively-valenced and negatively-valenced scores
were calculated by summing together all items from the total scales (because there were too few items if we did so for the affective and cognitive subscales separately) that referred to
positive and negative emotions respectively (see Table 1), excluding all items for which emotional valence was not specified. *p< 0.05, **p<0.01.
FIGURE 7 | Mean authenticity discrimination scores comparing males and females for (A) children and (B) adults. Error bars =  1 SEM.
expressions in adults (with fear correlations in both age groups,
and sad correlations in children, not analysable due to the chance
performance).
Discussion
The present study is the first to test children’s ability to discrimi-
nate the authenticity of facial expressions for any basic emotions
beyond happy, using stimuli in which the genuinely-felt or posed
nature of the underlying emotion is known from the self-reports of
the person appearing in the photograph. Overall, our results indi-
cate that 8–12-year-olds have some ability to discriminate authen-
ticity in facial expressions, but are immature relative to adults both
in their performance level and in the strategies they use to achieve
that performance. For happiness, in which genuinely-felt expres-
sions were more intense than posed expressions, children were
able to successfully discriminate expression authenticity from the
youngest age tested (i.e., 8 year olds), but they did not perform as
well as adults, and showed no improvement in this ability over the
8–12 year old age range. When genuinely-felt facial expressions
were notmore intense than the posed versions for our sad and fear
stimuli, then children failed to discriminate authenticity, whereas
adults could for sad expressions, arguing that the sad expressions
included some other cue or cues to authenticity that children
failed to use. Overall, children appeared to judge authenticity
exclusively based on intensity of the expression, for all three
expressions. In contrast, adults used intensity combined with
other factor/s, which for happy expressions may include empathic
responses.
Ruling Out Uninteresting Interpretations
of Children’s Poor Performance
Before proceeding to discuss theoretically interesting interpreta-
tions of the differences between children and adults, it is important
to rule out uninteresting possibilities. This arises particularly
for the differences between children and adults in overall per-
formance level (rather than for evidence concerning different
strategies).
First, children’s poorer authenticity discrimination, found for
happy and sad, could not be explained by any inability to label the
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expressions. Children were as accurate at labeling happy and sad
expressions as adults.
Second, children’s poor performance cannot be explained by
failure to understand the task instructions. We verified that all
children understood the meaning of pretending as distinct from
genuinely-felt emotion, plus children’s above-chance performance
for happy expressions shows they were able to correctly follow the
instructions to choose the face that was “just pretending.”
Finally, it is important to evaluate whether children’s poor
performance might be attributed to factors associated with
general cognitive development that might lower laboratory
task performance independent of difficulties in perceiving
authenticity. As argued previously for other face tasks (e.g., McK-
one et al., 2012), such factors could include greater distractibility
in younger children (i.e., poorer concentration on the task) or,
in the present design, difficulties with remembering the order
in which two items were presented. For the present findings,
a number of observations argue against such an interpretation.
Concerning order, previous studies have shown that the type of
sequential task we used (participants have to remember which
item was first and which second, and indicate their choice after
a short delay) can easily be performed by children even at the
younger end of our age range, when the perceptual discrimination
between the two items is straightforward (e.g., accuracy >90%
for 9-years-olds in remembering the order of faces displaying
happy, sad and fear expressions; Pollak and Kistler, 2002). Con-
cerning distractibility and other attention-related factors, if these
factors were responsible for our children’s poor performance, then
we would have expected to see authenticity-task performance
improve significantly across the 8–12 year age range (because it
is plausible that distractibility decreases across this age range);
yet this was not the case. And, further, distractibility and other
attention-related factors would be expected to lower children’s
slope in our plots of authenticity performance against relative
intensity (Figure 6D)—because lapses in attention would increase
random errors in responses, having the result of pushing both
ends of the line toward chance (0.5) thus decreasing its slope—yet,
again, this was not the case (i.e., children’s sensitivity to intensity
was no weaker than adults’).
Overall, we argue our that our results do not reflect difficul-
ties with task demands, but instead indicate that children aged
8–12 years have poor actual ability to discriminate authenticity in
the faces.
What Cues Do Children Use to Discriminate
Authenticity?
Our results argue that 8–12 year old children use immature strate-
gies relative to adults to determine authenticity of facial emotion,
relying only on intensity and not other additional cues.
Concerning intensity, we found that the children were equally
as sensitive to intensity as a cue to authenticity as adults. This
early sensitivity to intensity is in agreement with the two previ-
ous studies (Del Giudice and Colle, 2007; Thibault et al., 2009),
which showed that children use intensity to judge facial expression
authenticity—and rely on it asmuch ormore so than adults—from
as young as 4 years of age. Importantly, these previous studies
tested only happy faces, and the present study has replicated
and extended this result to also include negative-valence facial
expressions.
Beyond intensity, we found no evidence that 8–12-year-olds
could use any additional strategies. Concerning reliable-AUs, for
sad AU1+4 was present in the genuine versions of our stimuli and
absent in the pretend versions, yet children could not discriminate
authenticity for sad faces above chance (contrasting with evidence
that adults can use AU1+4 to determine authenticity; McLellan
et al., 2010; but see Mehu et al., 2012). With respect to happy, our
correlationswith intensity across all three expressions (Figure 6D)
are not inconsistent with ideas that children may potentially use
AU6 but (in contrast to the conclusion of Thibault et al., 2009)
suggest AU6 affects children’s authenticity judgements only to the
extent that the presence of AU6 increases the intensity of happy
expressions. The idea that 8–12-year-olds do not yet use reliable-
AUs effectively is also consistent with results for happy from Del
Giudice and Colle (2007), who found 8-year-olds, unlike adults,
interpreted a facial action that is similar to AU6, AU7 (the “lid
tightener”), as signaling authentic happiness. We also found no
suggestion that children used any strategies related to empathy (as
potentially used by adults).
Overall, the results of the present study converge with previous
findings to support a theoretical view in which intensity is the pri-
mary or only cue that elementary or primary-school aged children
use to judge facial expression authenticity, and that the difference
between adults and children in authenticity-discrimination ability
arises because adults develop extra strategies in addition to inten-
sity that emerge later in development (i.e., after 12 years of age).
An important question, then, becomes why is it that intensity
would emerge earlier during development than other strategies?
Concerning why intensity is learned early, one possibility
might be that (a) intensity might have particular real-world
value as an authenticity cue for happy expressions (i.e., more
intense smiles are more likely to be genuine; Hess et al., 1995;
Krumhuber and Manstead, 2009), combined with (b) children
might have more opportunity to learn about the authenticity
of happy than other emotions in early life, due to explicit
instruction from parents (even young children are taught to
pretend happiness in keeping with social norms, e.g., “smile for
the camera”) and/or having regular opportunities to observe
genuine-pretend contingencies (i.e., their parents display intense
happy expressions in response to something funny, and less
intense happy expressions when politely greeting a disliked
relative). Indeed, it may then be that initial learning of the
value of intensity for determining genuineness of happy faces is
extended by children (and adults) to a use of this cue for other
emotions including, potentially, to emotions where intensity is in
fact not a valid cue to authenticity (as for our sad and fear stimuli
in the present laboratory study; and as indeed could occur in
the real world where, for example, we know of no evidence as to
whether genuinely-felt sad or fear expressions are typically more,
or less, intense than their pretend counterparts).
Concerning why it is that other facial cues to authenticity (e.g.,
reliable-AUs, arousal cues) are learned later in development, a
plausible possibility is that these are simply less physically obvious
than intensity, resulting in young children either failing to perceive
these more subtle cues or, perhaps, correctly perceiving them but
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failing to have learnt what they mean (e.g., 6–7 year olds do not
consciously know the AU6 display rule; that is, “wrinkles around
the eyes mean someone is really feeling happy,” Gosselin et al.,
2002b).
What Additional Cues Do Adults Use
to Discriminate Authenticity?
Our results argue that adults use extra strategies in addition to
intensity information. Concerning the nature of these strategies,
the present study investigated correlations with empathy, and
found evidence potentially consistent with adults using empathy-
related strategies for determining authenticity of happy faces (but
not sad faces). Concerning the correlation with affective empa-
thy, theoretically, we suggest that participants might be able to
use awareness of their own empathic response to the faces (e.g.,
Manera et al., 2013) to help judge authenticity. This is on the
assumption that affective responses to genuine expressions might
be stronger than to pretend ones, and this increased response to
genuine faces might be greater in individuals with high affec-
tive empathy than in individuals with lower affective empathy.
This reasoning predicts a positive correlation between affective
empathy and authenticity discrimination ability, as we found.
Concerning the correlation with cognitive empathy, then a pos-
itive correlation—as we found—is predicted if we assume that
cognitive empathymight include knowledge of what physical cues
are indicative of expression authenticity (e.g., that AU6 signals
genuine happiness). (Importantly, we note that both these ideas
make an assumption about the direction of causation, namely
that empathy is causing strategies that assist with authenticity
discrimination. It is, of course, equally possible that the correlation
between the two variables could reflect an opposite-direction
causality, in which individuals who are better at recognizing
authentic emotions in others’ faces go on to develop higher
empathy as a result, at least by the time they are adults).
Regarding other possible strategies, our results suggest that
adults use reliable-AU1+4 for sad, given that: this AUwas present
in our genuine stimuli and absent from the posed versions; and
adult authenticity performance was above chance at the same
time that intensity of the genuine and pretend versions was equal
and there was no association with empathy. This adds to earlier
evidence that adults use reliable-AUs (AU6 for happy, Del Giudice
and Colle, 2007, Thibault et al., 2012) or proposed reliable-AUs
for other emotions (e.g., AU15 for panic fear, Mehu et al., 2012) to
judge authenticity. Additionally, adults may also use other phys-
ical cues within faces that have been proposed to differ between
genuine and posed expressions (e.g., signs of physical arousal such
as pupil dilation or skin “blushing,” Levenson, 2014; or symmetry,
Ekman, 2003).
Why Can’t Even Adults Discriminate
the Authenticity of the Fear Expressions?
In our study, neither adults nor children could discriminate the
authenticity of the fearful expression stimuli. This finding agrees
with one of the two previous (adult) studies of fear stimuli gener-
ated using the sameMiles/McLellanmethod (Douglas et al., 2012,
obtained A’ = 0.48 where chance is 0.5) and is not very different
from the other (which found significant but weak discrimination
ability; A’ = 0.61, McLellan et al., 2010). We suggest two possi-
ble explanations for poor authenticity discrimination of the fear
expressions.
One idea is that, while it may be adaptive to discriminate
authenticity of most emotions (including in the present context,
happy and sad), for fear “the negative consequences of failing
to detect (fear) and then avoid (the cause of that fear) perhaps
render even close approximations of fear signals as real” (McLellan
et al., 2010, p. 1285). That is, it may be that it is adaptive to
treat all fear expressions as if they are genuine (i.e., in everyday
life, this could allow a person to rapidly avoid danger without
waiting for a more time-consuming analysis of authenticity to be
completed).
Alternatively, the inability to tell apart genuine and posed
fear could reflect physical characteristics of the particular
Miles/McLellan stimuli. These might fail to match real-world
genuine fear faces in at least two ways. First, as noted, reliable-AUs
for fear have not been empirically validated (although suggestions
have been made by Ekman, 2003), and thus it is not known
whether the fear stimuli included reliable-AUs (should they exist).
Second, the fear faces are probably only modest in terms of the
underlying strength of the emotion felt by the person shown in the
stimulus photograph, meaning that the potential for the presence
of other physical cues to genuineness (particularly arousal cues,
i.e., pupil dilation, skin tone changes, etc.) may be limited. This
is an intrinsic limitation of any fear face stimuli created in a
laboratory setting. It is difficult to invoke a very strong feeling of
fear in the lab: for somebody to feel strong fear, they must believe
there is real danger, and it is not ethical or practical to, for example,
release a tiger into the lab, or to set off a bomb. By comparison, it is
much easier to induce strong underlying emotions of happiness in
the lab (e.g., there are no ethical problems with making somebody
laugh hilariously).
Limitations
The present study has a number of limitations on scope, with
corresponding implications for generalisability of the results. Per-
haps most significantly, we used a small sample of stimuli (from
McLellan and colleagues, personal communication, 2011). We
chose to do this because we are unaware of any other stim-
ulus sets meeting the core criteria we wanted our stimuli to
meet: a set containing happy, sad and fear; in which the same
model displays both genuine and pretend versions; for which
it has been verified by self-report of the people photographed
that their underlying emotions were indeed genuinely-felt, or
pretended, respectively; and for which FACS coding confirmed
the presence of empirically-supported reliable-AU markers in
the genuine version (i.e., AU6 for happy and AU1+4 for sad).
This small set of stimuli, however, is limited in four important
ways. Regarding intensity, the genuine sad and fear faces are only
moderate in expression intensity (Figure 5), and likely correspond
to rather substantially lower intensity of the underlying emotion
than would occur in some real world situations (e.g., bereave-
ment; a terrorist attack); thus, we cannot rule out that above-
chance authenticity discrimination might emerge for sad and fear
expressions in children (and for fear in adults), if the genuine
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expression reflects a more intense underlying emotion (even if
the pretend expression is also high-intensity to match). Concern-
ing age of the faces, all images showed adults, and children may
have more experience with children displaying genuine versus
pretend sadness (e.g., siblings faking tears to get sympathy from
a parent), and we also used static photographs while real-world
facial expressions are dynamic (over a few hundred milliseconds,
the expression begins to appear, reaches its maximum intensity,
and then disappears again) that include additional physical differ-
ences between genuinely-felt and pretend emotions (e.g., genuine
expressions have smoother onset and offset than posed ones; e.g.,
Schmidt et al., 2006). Thus we cannot rule out the possibility
that authenticity discrimination could improve if movie-images,
or children’s faces, were used. Concerning the number of stimuli,
it is possible that using a larger set may increase statistical power;
while power alone seems unlikely to account for our finding that
children could not discriminate sad authenticity above chance
(given that the mean performance was 46% with a large number
of child participants, i.e., n = 85), in the case of the y-intercept
from our intensity analysis, this was numerically above 0.5 for
children (i.e., y-intercept = 0.56). Potentially, additional stimuli
might reduce the SE of the y-intercept value and thus increase
the chances of finding evidence that children make some use
of strategies additional to intensity (i.e., y-intercept significantly
above 0.5).
It is also worth noting that the present study has only tested
children’s ability to make explicit decisions about authenticity.
It would also be of interest to know whether children show
differential implicit responses to genuine and posed facial expres-
sions (as has been found in adults; e.g., Peace et al., 2006; Miles
and Johnston, 2007). Potentially, differences in implicit behavior
might emerge earlier than explicit knowledge; for example, even
young children might show greater willingness to help a person
displaying genuine than posed sadness.
Conclusion
Our study has provided the first test of authenticity discrimination
in children for facial expressions of basic emotions beyond happy
(i.e., also sad and fear), including the first examination of use of
intensity as a cue to authenticity across this broader range of emo-
tions, plus the first test of relationships with empathy. Our results
imply that authenticity discrimination from facial expressions
matures surprisingly late in development, specifically some time
during the teenage years, with children aged 8–12 having devel-
oped adult-like use of expression intensity as a cue to authenticity,
but failing to show significant use of skills related to reliable-
AUs (for sad) and empathy (for happy). This late maturity of
authenticity discrimination ability for facial expressions suggests
it will be important in future research to ascertain how its devel-
opment impacts on social skills, such as friendship formation and
maintenance, during the late primary school and teenage years.
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